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NOTES
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Milwaukee Parental Choice Pro-
gram Upheld. Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992).
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of providing public financial aid to allow parents the choice
to educate their children in private schools dates to the eighteenth century
when it was advocated by Adam Smith,1 Thomas Jefferson,' and Thomas
Paine.' This concept became policy with the enactment of the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program (MPCP) in April 1990.4 The MPCP allows a
limited number of Milwaukee students5 whose families meet low income
requirements6 to enroll in nonsectarian private schools7 that receive approx-
imately $2,500 per pupil.'
In Davis v. Grover,9 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Milwau-
kee Parental Choice Program did not violate the three provisions of the
1. DAVID W. KIRKPATRICK, CHOICE IN SCHOOLING 25-31 (1990); see also Shawn T. New-
man, Note, Education Vouchers and Tuition Tax Credits: In Search of Viable Public Aid to Private
Education, 10 J. LEGIS. 178, 180 & n.16 (1983).
2. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 1, at 34.
3. Id; see also E.G. West, Tom Paine's Voucher Scheme for Public Education, 33 S. ECON. J.
378 (1967) (Paine proposed that state governments pay poor families to educate their children
under fourteen years old); Newman, supra note 1, at 180 & n.15.
4. Wis. STAT. § 119.23 (1989-90).
5. No more than 1% of the school district's membership may attend choice schools in any
school year. Wis. STAT. § 119.23(2)(b)(1) (1989-90). Because the MPCP currently applies only
to Milwaukee, it has a maximum enrollment of about 1000 students. At the end of the 1990-1991
school year, 249 students were enrolled in the MPCP. Eighty-six of these students did not return
to the MPCP at the beginning of the 1991-1992 school year when the program had 534 pupils in 6
participating schools. Priscilla Ahlgren, Scores Aren't Up Under School Choice, MILWAUKEE J.,
Nov. 21, 1991, at Al.
6. An eligible pupil's family income may not exceed 175% of the federal poverty level. WIs.
STAT. § 119.23(2)(a) (1989-90).
7. Wis. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a) (1989-90). The United States Supreme Court has often declared
state aid plans benefitting parochial schools unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Ron-
aid D. Rotunda, The Constitutional Future of the Bill of Rights: A Closer Look at Commercial
Speech and State Aid to Religiously Affiliated Schools, 65 N.C. L. REv. 917, 929-30 (1987); see, e.g.
Committee For Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
8. Ahlgren, supra note 5, at Al. The MPCP is funded out of state aid to the Milwaukee
Public Schools. WIs. STAT. § 119.23(4)-(5) (1989-90). Under the MPCP, the state directly pays
schools chosen by parents instead of giving vouchers to parents to pay schools or tax credits to
parents who pay private school tuition.
9. 166 Wis. 2d 501, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992).
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Wisconsin Constitution under which it was challenged. First, the court
found that the MPCP was not "local" legislation. Therefore, its passage as
part of a multi-subject bill was not proscribed by the private or local bill
clause of the Wisconsin Constitution.10 Second, the majority found that the
private schools participating in the MPCP were not public district schools
subject to the Wisconsin Constitution's requirement that they provide a
uniform" "character of instruction."' 2 Public schools satisfy this require-
ment, and the MPCP is merely an additional educational experiment to do
more than that which is constitutionally mandated. 13 Finally, the court
held that the MPCP met the requirements of the implicit constitutional
doctrine that public money be spent for a public purpose because it "con-
tains sufficient and reasonable controls to attain its public purpose."' 4
Nonetheless, Davis left unclear two state constitutional issues. First, is
there a presumption of constitutionality when a statute's enactment is chal-
lenged as violating a procedural constitutional provision? Second, when de-
termining whether legislation addressing a statutory classification is
"private" or "local," should a reviewing court consider only the general
characteristics of that class, or the characteristics of specific cities within
the class?
This Note begins with a summary of the facts of Davis. It then ad-
dresses and explores the background of the three state constitutional issues
involved, discusses the majority and dissenting opinions, and analyzes the
court's decision. This Note concludes by providing several future implica-
tions of Davis v. Grover.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program was enacted into law as part
of a larger budget adjustment bill on April 27, 1990.1' The litigation sur-
10. Id. at 512, 480 N.W.2d at 462.
11. WIs. CONST. art. X, § 3.
12. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 538, 539, 480 N.W.2d at 473, 474 (citing Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis.
2d 469, 492, 436 N.W.2d 568, 577 (1989)).
13. Id. at 539, 480 N.W.2d at 474.
14. Id. at 546, 480 N.W.2d at 477.
15. Davis v. Grover, 159 Wis. 2d 150, 158, 464 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Ct. App. 1990), rev'd 166
Wis. 2d 501, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992).
During 1988 and 1989, Wisconsin's Governor Thompson proposed programs allowing parents
to send their children to the schools of their choice. Id. at 168-69, 464 N.W.2d at 228.
In October 1989, a bipartisan coalition of forty-seven members of the Assembly and nine
Senate co-sponsors introduced the bill that eventually became the MPCP. It was referred to the
Committee on Urban Education, which held a public hearing in February, 1990. After this hear-
ing, where appearances or registrations for or against the bill were made by many of the parties
interested in or affected by the bill, the committee recommended the passage of an amended ver-
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rounding the MPCP was prompted when Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion Herbert Grover required that schools participating in the MPCP file an
"Intent to Participate" form, which required compliance with statutory and
regulatory provisions in addition to those already required by section
119.23.16 On June 25, 1990, on behalf of eligible pupils, plaintiffs-respon-
dents, Davis and others,'7 sued for issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering
the immediate implementation of the MPCP and enjoining Superintendent
Grover from impairing implementation. 8 Opponents, including Milwau-
kee teacher-parent and school administrator groups, as well as the Milwau-
kee branch of the NAACP, 19 intervened on June 27, 1990, one day after the
Wisconsin Supreme Court denied them original jurisdiction.20
The circuit court did not find the MPCP facially unconstitutional.21
Judge Steingass held that, in light of the presumption of constitutionality
given to legislation, the MPCP did not violate any of the three state consti-
tutionally found provisions under which it was challenged. The court
found that the MPCP satisfied the public purpose doctrine (i.e., the implicit
constitutional requirement that public expenditures be only for public pur-
poses) for two reasons: first, it served as an educational experiment whose
results could benefit the entire state and second, it had internal controls
adequate for this purpose.22 The court found that the Uniformity Clause23
sion of the bill. After making an additional amendment and rejecting several others, the Assembly
passed the bill by a 62-35 vote. Id. at 169, 464 N.W.2d at 228.
On March 15, 1990, Assembly Bill 601 went to the Wisconsin Senate where it was immedi-
ately referred to the Committee on Educational Financing, Higher Education and Tourism. BUL-
LETIN OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE 1989-90 SESSION, at 3-169
(1990). Five days later, on Monday, March 20, 1990, the Joint Finance committee added it to a
budget adjustment bill. It was accompanied by the title, "Milwaukee Parental Choice Program,"
and an analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau. 1989 Wis. S. Bill 542. The Senate passed the
bill on March 21, 1990. Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 566, 480 N.W.2d 460, 486 (Bablitch,
J., dissenting). The Assembly passed the budget adjustment bill and Governor Thompson signed
it, but he vetoed the MPCP's sunset provision. Davis, 159 Wis. 2d at 170, 464 N.W.2d at 228.
16. Davis v. Grover, No. 90 CV 2576, at 4-5 (Dist. Ct. Branch 8, Aug. 6, 1990) (unpublished
opinion), rev'd, 159 Wis. 2d 150, 464 N.W.2d 220 (Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 480
N.W.2d 460 (1992).
17. Davis, 159 Wis. 2d at 155 n.1, 464 N.W.2d at 222 n.1.
18. Davis, No. 90 CV 2576, at 2.
19. Id. at 5-6.
20. Davis, 159 Wis. 2d at 155 n.1, 464 N.W.2d at 222 n.1.
21. Davis, No. 90 CV 2576, at 2. However, Judge Steingass found that the plaintiffs had not
made sufficient showings to issue a temporary injunction and a writ of mandamus. Her Honor
took the request under advisement until further information was secured. Id. at 24-25. The cir-
cuit court's final judgment, allowing the MPCP to proceed, was issued on August 10, 1990.
22. ad at 6-11.
23. The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which
shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free and without charge
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of the Wisconsin Constitution was not applicable because a private school
does not become public by its acceptance of public money and pupils.24
Additionally, the court determined that the MPCP was not a private or
local bill, because education is a "state responsibility of statewide dimen-
sion," education in Milwaukee is a statewide concern, and the results of the
experiment would be applied statewide.25 Thus, although passed in a multi-
subject bill, the Parental Choice Program was enacted constitutionally
under the private bill clause of the Wisconsin Constitution.26
Finally, Judge Steingass held that Superintendent Grover could not reg-
ulate private schools in the program "in a manner more onerous or de-
manding than that insisted upon for other participating programs and
public schools."27
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that the
MPCP was unconstitutionally enacted under the private bill clause of the
Wisconsin Constitution2" because it failed under the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's test to prove that it was not "private or local" legislation. Thus, its
passage as part of a multi-subject bill was unconstitutional under article IV,
section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution.29 In dicta, the court suggested a
new test for "experimental" legislation, which the Parental Choice Program
might satisfy. 0
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of ap-
peals, finding that the MPCP satisfied the three constitutional provisions
under which it was challenged. However, three justices wrote individual
dissents.3 Even so, "[n]o injunction was ever issued against32 the Milwau-
kee Parental Choice Program, which continue[d] to operate."
for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years; and no sectarian instruction
shall be allowed therein but the legislature by law may, for the purpose of religious instruc-
tion outside the district schools, authorize release of students during regular school hours.
WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
24. Davis, No. 90 CV 2576, at 15.
25. Id. at 18-19.
26. Id. at 10-19. "No private or local bill which may be passed by the legislature shall em-
brace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Wis. CONsT. art. IV, § 18.
The circuit court did not presume constitutionality when considering the article IV, section 18
challenge. Davis, No. 90 CV 2576, at 17.
27. Davis, No. 90 CV 2576, at 24. Superintendent Grover never appealed this issue. Davis v.
Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 518, 480 N.W.2d 460, 465 (1992).
28. Davis. v. Grover, 159 Wis. 2d 150, 156, 464 N.W.2d 220, 222 (Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 166
Wis. 2d 501,480 N.W.2d 460 (1992). The court did not address whether the program violated the
Uniformity Clause or the public purpose doctrine. Id. at 157 n.3, 262 N.W.2d at 223 n.3.
29. Id. at 156-57, 464 N.W.2d at 223.
30. Id. at 167-68, 464 N.W.2d at 227.
31. Chief Justice Heffernan, Justice Abrahamson, and Justice Bablitch wrote separate dissent-
ing opinions. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 548-76, 480 N.W.2d at 478-90.
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III. DID PASSAGE OF THE MPCP VIOLATE THE PRIVATE OR LOCAL
BILL CLAUSE?
A. Background of Article IV, Section 18 Law
In the nineteenth century, state legislators were pressured by their con-
stituents to pass a variety of legislation and, consequently, laws affecting
only private or local interests outnumbered laws affecting general statewide
interests.33 This special legislation on substantive matters often "fixed pen-
alties, awarded new court trials, adjusted individual insolvencies, and
granted divorces." 3 Unfavorable public reaction to this abuse of legisla-
tion, which amounted to the exercise of judicial power, led to the adoption
of article IV, section 18." Article IV, section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion provides: "No private or local bill which may be passed by the legisla-
ture shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the
title." It has remained unchanged since the adoption of the original consti-
tution of 1848.36
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognizes three public policy purposes
for article IV, section 18:
1) to encourage the legislature to devote its time to the state at
large, its primary responsibility; 2) to avoid the specter of favoritism
and discrimination, a potential which is inherent in laws of limited
applicability; and 3) to alert the public through its elected represent-
atives to the real nature and subject matter of legislation under
consideration. 37
Article IV, section 18 case law has developed along two lines. In Mil-
waukee Brewers Baseball Club v. Department of Health and Social Services,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed the issue of legislation that is
32. Id at 518, 480 N.W.2d at 465.
33. Soo Line R.R. v. Department of Trans., 101 Wis. 2d 64, 71-72 & n.5, 303 N.W.2d 626,
630 & n.5 (1981).
34. JAMES W. HuRsT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 79 (1950).
35. Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club v. Department of Health & Social Servs., 130 Wis. 2d
79, 153, 387 N.W.2d 254, 286 (1986) (Steinmetz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
1871, section 31 was added to article IV of the Wisconsin Constitution. City of Brookfield v.
Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 144 Wis. 2d 896, 904, 426 N.W.2d 591, 595 (1988). This
section lists nine situations in which the legislature is prohibited from enacting special or private
laws. Section 32 was included to allow the legislature to pass general laws dealing with the nar-
row situations enumerated in § 31, as long as "'such laws shall be uniform in their operation
throughout the state."' Iii at 904-05 & n.3, 426 N.W.2d at 595-96 & n.3.
36. This provision first appeared as article VI, § 4 in the rejected 1846 constitution. Re-
printed in H.A. TENNEY & DAVID ATwoOD, MEMORIAL RECORD OF THE FATHERS OF WIS-
CONSIN 311 (1880).
37. Milwaukee Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 107-08, 115, 387 N.W.2d at 266, 269.
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facially specific to any person, place, or thing.38 It held that such legislation
is private or local under article IV, section 18 unless: "1) the general sub-
ject matter of the provision relates to a state responsibility of statewide di-
mension; and 2) its enactment will have direct and immediate effect on a
specific statewide concern or interest. 39
In City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District," the
Wisconsin Supreme Court analyzed "legislation that arises in a classifica-
tion context that is not specific on its face and does not run afoul of the
specific prohibitions of sec. 31 but allegedly runs afoul of sec. 18. "41 The
Brookfield court summarized a multi-rule test developed in cases arising
under article IV, sections 31 and 32, which had come to be applied to sec-
tion 18 cases,42 to determine whether legislation applying to general classifi-
cations (e.g., of cities) "is impermissibly local or private because the
generality is simply a surface sham."'4 3 If a law meets the following criteria
it will be considered general legislation and can be passed in a multi-subject
bill:
First, the classification employed by the legislature must be
based on substantial distinctions which make one class really differ-
ent from another.
Second, the classification adopted must be germane to the pur-
pose of the law.
Third, the classification must not be based on existing circum-
stances only. Instead, the classification must be subject to being
open, such that other cities could join the class.
38. Id. The origins of the Brewers doctrine are found in Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 109
Wis. 9, 85 N.W. 131 (1901), which held a statute to be "local" or "private" under article IV, § 18,
if it applied to a particular site or entity. Id. Even a law affecting a specified locality was held to
be not local if its subject was a statewide concern. Monka v. State Conservation Comm'n, 202
Wis. 39, 42, 231 N.W. 273, 274 (1930). The court in Soo Line R.R. v. Department Of Trans., 101
Wis. 2d 64, 303 N.W.2d 626 (1981), found a statute (enacted as part of a multi-subject budget bill)
requiring a specific railroad to build an at-grade crossing at a specific location to be impermissibly
local under article IV, § 18 because it did not have a sufficiently direct effect on the statewide
interest in highway safety. Id. at 75, 303 N.W.2d at 632-33. The Brewers court held that a statute,
which established a state prison at a specific site in Milwaukee's Menomonee River Valley had a
sufficiently direct and immediate effect on the statewide concern of prison overcrowding and thus
was constitutional under article IV, § 18. Milwaukee Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 117-21, 387 N.W.2d
at 270-72.
39. Milwaukee Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 115, 387 N.W.2d at 269.
40. 144 Wis. 2d 896, 426 N.W.2d 591 (1988).
41. Id. at 912, 426 N.W.2d at 599. A third category of special legislation, that applying to
the situations enumerated in article IV, § 31, is beyond the scope of this Note. See supra note 35.
42. See Lamasco Realty Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 242 Wis. 357, 8 N.W.2d 372 (1943);
Whitefish Bay v. Milwaukee County, 224 Wis. 373, 271 N.W. 416 (1937); Wagner v. Milwaukee
County, 112 Wis. 601, 88 N.W. 577 (1902).
43. Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 914, 426 N.W.2d at 600.
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Fourth, when a law applies to a class, it must apply equally to all
members of the class....
[F]ifth... the characteristics of each class should be so far differ-
ent from those of the other classes so as to reasonably suggest at
least the propriety, having regard to the public good, of substantially
different legislation....
[S]ixth... when the legislation is curative in nature, as long as
the curative legislation applies equally to all members of the class,
the legislation is general.4
Whether or not there is a presumption of constitutionality in article IV,
section 18 cases has been in dispute. In 1981, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that a "statute is presumed constitutional and.., the challenger must
prove the law to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."45 There
has been a traditional presumption of constitutionality in cases challenging
"special and private laws" under article IV, section 31, which involve pub-
lic policy concerns similar to those addressed in section 18.46 The presump-
tion is still viable in other types of cases.47 The presumption of
constitutionality is based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers in which the three branches of government are considered equals.
It presumes that the legislature acts knowingly when it passes legislation.
In 1988, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Brookfield first departed from
the presumption of constitutionality in article IV, section 18 cases: "because
the legislature is alleged to have violated a law of constitutional stature
which mandates the form in which bills must pass ...., The court's
concern focused on article IV, section 18's procedural requirement that leg-
islation burdening or benefiting private entities be passed in "single subject,
44. Id. at 907-08, 426 N.W.2d at 597. The first four criteria were first outlined in Johnson v.
City of Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383, 390-92, 60 N.W. 270, 271-72 (1894). The fifth was added by
State ex rel Risch v. Board of Trustees, 121 Wis. 44, 54, 98 N.W. 954, 957 (1904). The sixth
originated in Madison Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. Stein, 47 Wis. 2d 349, 364, 177 N.W.2d 131, 136
(1970).
45. Soo Line R.R. v. Department of Trans., 101 Wis. 2d 64, 76, 303 N.W.2d 626, 632 (1981).
46. See generally Madison Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. Stein, 47 Wis. 2d 349, 177 N.W.2d 131,
135 (1970); State ex reL Risch v. Board of Trustees, 121 Wis. 44, 54, 98 N.W. 954, 958 (1904);
Adams v. City of Beloit, 105 Wis. 363, 81 N.W. 869, 872 (1900).
47. E.g., GTE Sprint Communications Corp. v. Wisconsin Bell, 155 Wis. 2d 184, 192, 454
N.W.2d 797, 800 (1990).
48. Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 912-13 n.5, 426 N.W.2d at 599 n.5. Curiously, the Brookfield
court cited Soo Line, 101 Wis. 2d 64, 303 N.W.2d 626, which did presume constitutionality.
Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 902, 426 N.W.2d at 592.
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clearly titled bills."49 The purpose of this requirement was to prevent such
legislation from being smuggled through the legislature by "internal
logrolling."5 °
In the concurring and dissenting opinions written by Justices Ceci and
Steinmetz, in Brewers, the justices emphasized that when legislators must
vote upon a state budget bill which also includes private or local legislation,
as had occurred in Brewers, Brookfield, and Davis, they cannot vote their
convictions on both.51 The Brookfield court recognized that under such
circumstances the legislature cannot be presumed to have given the full con-
sideration upon which the presumption of constitutionality is based. 2 "In-
stead, the court will proceed to determine whether the law is procedurally
proper without recourse to the rational basis test."53
B. The Majority And Concurring Opinions
Justice Callow, writing for the majority in Davis v. Grover,54 held that
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program"5 is not a private or local bill, and
thus, not subject to the procedural requirements of article IV, section 18 of
the Wisconsin Constitution.16 The majority two-part analysis began by
considering "whether the process in which the bill was enacted deserves a
presumption of constitutionality."57
Addressing the Brookfield court's concern of whether the legislature
had adequately considered or discussed challenged legislation passed as part
of a multi-subject bill, the court examined the record of the MPCP's pas-
sage.58 The court considered such factors as: the fact that the MPCP was
proposed in several consecutive years; its introduction by a significant
number of legislators; the Assembly Committee on Urban Education's pub-
lic hearing on the proposed program; the Assembly's passage of the pro-
gram as a separate, single subject bill; and the Senate's debate and adoption
49. Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 912 n.5, 426 N.W.2d at 599 n.5.
50. Id. Wisconsin has criminalized logrolling by legislators trading votes, a different but re-
lated issue. Wis. STAT. § 13.05 (1989-90).
51. Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club v. Department of Health & Social Servs., 130 Wis. 2d
79, 145, 156-58, 387 N.W.2d 254, 282, 287-88 (1986) (Ceci, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
52. Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 918-19 n.6, 426 N.W.2d at 601 n.6.
53. Id. at 913 n.5, 426 N.W.2d at 599 n.5.
54. Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992). Justice Callow was joined by
Justices Day and Steinmetz. Justice Ceci concurred.
55. Wis. STAT. § 119.23 (1989-90).
56. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 512, 480 N.W.2d at 462.
57. Id. at 520, 480 N.W.2d at 466.
58. Id. at 521, 480 N.W.2d at 466 (citing City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage
Dist., 144 Wis. 2d 896, 918-19 n.6, 426 N.W.2d 591, 601 n.6).
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of an amendment specific to the MPCP.59 The majority found "no evidence
in this case that suggests the program was smuggled or logrolled through
the legislature without the benefit of deliberate legislative consideration."'
It concluded that the legislature had "intelligently participate[d] in consid-
ering" the program, and therefore, the bill's passage should be accorded a
presumption of constitutionality.61
The Davis majority next turned to the issue of whether the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program is a private or local bill in violation of article IV,
section 18. It detailed three prongs of analysis: The Brewers test for legisla-
tion facially specific to people, places, or entities; the specific prohibitions
and exemptions of article IV, sections 31 and 32; and the Brookfield test for
classification legislation passed in multi-subject bills. 62 The supreme court
rejected the court of appeals' suggestion that it adopt a modified version of
the Brewers test for allegedly "experimental" legislation.63
The court used the Brookfield test to determine that Wisconsin Statute
section 119.23 involves a classification. This decision was based upon sev-
eral factors. The MPCP's text and placement in the statutes indicated that
it applied to any school district in a first class city.' Furthermore, the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program was not limited to Milwaukee;
Madison has the required population of 150,000 or more to be a first class
city and could declare itself to be one.65 Although the legislation expressly
referred to Milwaukee, Le., the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, the
supreme court, by analogy, applied the rule that the title of a statute is not
part of the statute itself to encompass legislative bills as well. 6 The court
determined that the MPCP "involve[d] a classification and not expressly a
specific person, place or thing." 6
7
The majority applied the five-part Brookfield test to determine whether
the MPCP was private or local legislation under article IV, section 18 of the
Wisconsin Constitution. The first element is that "the classification em-
ployed by the legislature must be based on substantial distinctions which
59. See id at 521-22, 480 N.W.2d at 466.
60. Id at 522, 480 N.W.2d at 467.
61. Id at 523, 480 N.W.2d at 467 (citation omitted).
62. Id at 524-25, 480 N.W.2d at 467-68.
63. Id at 527 n.l1, 480 N.W.2d at 469 n.ll.
64. Id. at 526-27, 480 N.W.2d at 468-69. Chapter 119 applies only to cities of the first class.
Wis. STAT. § 119.01 (1989-90).
65. Id. at 527, 480 N.W.2d at 469; see Wis. STAT. § 62.05 (1989-90).
66. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 527, 480 N.W.2d at 469; see Wis. STAT. § 990.001(6) (1989-90);
Wisconsin Valley Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 9 Wis. 2d 606, 618, 101 N.W.2d 798,
804 (1960).
67. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 527, 480 N.W.2d at 469.
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make one class really different from another.' ' 6 The MPCP applied to first
class cities only.69 The court cited cases recognizing that first class cities
"by virtue of their large population and concentration of poverty, are sub-
stantially distinct from other cities."' 70 The court referred to statistical evi-
dence that the socio-economic disparities and educational problems of
Wisconsin's first class city, Milwaukee, are greater than elsewhere in the
state. It concluded that the classification to which the MPCP applied-first
class city school districts-is based on substantial distinctions from other
classes of cities.7
The majority then considered the second element, that "the classifica-
tion adopted must be germane to the purpose of the law."' 72 It agreed with
the trial court and the court of appeals that the MPCP was an "experiment
intended to address a perceived problem of inadequate educational opportu-
nities for disadvantaged children. '' 73  The majority reached this conclusion
based upon the MPCP's requirement of the compilation and reporting of
data and its original five-year sunset provision, which Governor Thompson
vetoed. 74 The court concluded that locating the Parental Choice Program
in Wisconsin's first class city was germane to the law's purpose:
Clearly, improving the quality of education and educational oppor-
tunities in Wisconsin is a matter of statewide importance. The best
location to experiment with legislation aimed at improving the qual-
ity of education is in a first class city, a large urban area where the
socio-economic and educational disparities are greatest and the pri-
vate educational choices are most abundant. The experimental na-
ture of the MPCP places this case in direct contrast to Brookfield
where we found no relationship between Milwaukee county's size
and the challenged financing scheme.75
The majority found that the MPCP met the Brookfield test's third re-
quirement that "the classification must be subject to being open, such that
68. Id. (quoting City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 144 Wis. 2d 896,
907, 426 N.W.2d 591, 597 (1988)).
69. Id.; see Wis. STAT. § 62.05 (1989-90).
70. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 528, 480 N.W.2d at 469 (citing Lamasco Realty Co. v. Milwaukee,
242 Wis. 357, 377, 8 N.W.2d 372, 381 (1943) and State ex reL Nyberg v. Board of Sch. Directors,
190 Wis. 570, 577, 209 N.W. 683, 686 (1926).
71. See Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 528-30, 480 N.W.2d at 469-70.
72. Id. at 530, 480 N.W.2d at 470 (quoting City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage
Dist., 144 Wis. 2d, 896, 907, 426 N.W.2d 591, 597 (1988)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 533-34, 480 N.W.2d at 471-72; see Wis. STAT. § 119.23 (1989-90).
75. Id. at 534-35, 480 N.W.2d at 472 (citing City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewer-
age Dist., 144 Wis. 2d, 896, 920, 426 N.W.2d 591, 602 (1988)).
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other cities could join the class."' 76 Because Madison has a sufficient popu-
lation and need only declare itself a city of the first class to become one, the
MPCP's first class city classification is still open.7
The majority found no indication that the MPCP would not be applied
equally to other cities joining the first class designation in the future,
thereby satisfying the fourth element of the Brookfield test.78
The test's fifth element is that "the characteristics of each class should
be so far different from those of the other classes so as to reasonably suggest
at least the propriety, having regard to the public good, of substantially
different legislation."79 The majority reconsidered the socio-economic and
educational problems, as well as the variety of nonsectarian private schools
in Milwaukee, and found that the fifth element was satisfied."0
The majority concluded that the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program,
which applied to first class cities, was not private or local legislation. Thus,
its passage as part of a multi-subject budget adjustment bill was not uncon-
stitutional under article IV, section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 81
Justice Ceci's brief concurrence expressed his full accord with the ma-
jority. 2 He noted the MPCP's purpose as an experiment in improving
education. 3
C. The Dissents
Chief Justice Heffernan first challenged the majority's finding of a pre-
sumption of constitutionality.84 The chief justice noted: "One of the ratio-
nales that justifies the use of the presumption of constitutionality is that
when the legislature follows the constitutionally mandated procedures, the
democratic safeguards ensure that the law is the will of the legislature.185
The chief justice argued that this presumption cannot attach when the legis-
lature is alleged to have not followed constitutionally mandated procedures,
such as enacting a private or local law as part of a multi-subject bill. 6
76. Id. at 535, 480 N.W.2d at 472.
77. Id. at 535-36, 480 N.W.2d at 472.
78. Id at 536, 480 N.W.2d at 472-73.
79. Id. at 536, 480 N.W.2d at 473.
80. Id.
81. Id at 536-37, 480 N.W.2d at 473.
82. Id at 546-48, 480 N.W.2d at 477-78 (Ceci, J., concurring).
83. Id at 547, 480 N.W.2d at 477.
84. Id. at 548-49, 480 N.W.2d at 478 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
85. Id at 549, 480 N.W.2d at 478 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
86. Id (citing City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 144 Wis. 2d 896, 912-
13 n.5., 426 N.W.2d 591, 599 n.5. (1988)).
1992]
MAR QUETTE LAW REVIEW
Chief Justice Heffernan cited Brewers 87 to argue that article IV, section
18's requirement that private or local legislation not be passed as part of a
multi-subject bill is not only to prevent legislative fraud, but also to make
legislators accountable to their constituents for their votes on private or
local issues.88 The chief justice found the majority's attempt to review the
degree of consideration or deliberation accorded a piece of legislation not
only "an improper intrusion into the legislative process," but also impossi-
ble. 9 The chief justice suggested that review under article IV, section 18
should be limited to the bill's face and should be done with a "presumption
of regularity" that a public officer does not violate his duty. 0
Chief Justice Heffernan found the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
to be private or local legislation not only because of its title, its application
to Milwaukee, and the majority's citation of statistics regarding Milwaukee,
but also because it failed the first two elements of the Brookfield test.91 Cit-
ing the court of appeals' holding that the Brookfield analysis can only con-
sider the characteristics of a first class city, not the specific characteristics of
a particular first class city,9 2 the chief justice noted that not all first class
cities will necessarily have the concentration of poverty which the majority
found to make them substantially distinct from other cities.93
After concluding that the first element of the Brookfield test was not
satisfied, the chief justice found that the MPCP's first class city classifica-
tion was not germane to the law's purpose. First, Chief Justice Heffernan
was not convinced that the MPCP was an experiment: nothing on the bill's
face indicated it to be "experimental," it lacked both a statement of legisla-
tive purpose to conduct an experiment and a provision for expansion of the
program if it succeeded, and Governor Thompson vetoed the five-year sun-
set provision.94 Second, the chief justice agreed with the court of appeals
that even if the MPCP was an experiment, it "is not germane to limit the
87. Id. at 550, 480 N.W.2d at 478 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) (Steinmetz, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part and Ceci, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Milwau-
kee Brewers Baseball Club v. Department of Health & Social Servs., 130 Wis. 2d 79, 145, 156-58,
387 N.W.2d 254, 282, 287-88 (1986)).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 550, 480 N.W.2d at 478-79 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 550, 480 N.W.2d at 479 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) (citing Integration of Bar
Case, 244 Wis. 8, 28, 11 N.W.2d 604, 614 (1943)).
91. See id. at 550-53, 480 N.W.2d at 479-80 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
92. Id. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) (citing Davis v. Grover, 159 Wis. 2d 150, 162, 464
N.W.2d 220, 225 (Ct. App. 1990)).
93. See id. at 551-52, 480 N.W.2d at 479 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 553, 480 N.W.2d at 480 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
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experiment to the largest city in the state, or to any distinct class of cities in
the state."95
In her dissent, Justice Abrahamson expressed her dissatisfaction with all
analyses and tests for determining what constitutes a local or private law as
opposed to a general law: the majority and dissenting opinions, the Brook-
field test as to whether a law sets forth a classification, and the Brewers test
as to whether a law applies to a specific place or entity.96 Justice Abraham-
son was concerned that the "majority opinion, like the court's prior opin-
ions, again fails to explain the overlap between the classification test under
art. IV., sec. 18, and the test under the state constitutional equal protection
guarantee." 97
Justice Abrahamson agreed with Chief Justice Heffernan's and Justice
Bablitch's concern that the majority's presumption of constitutionality
based upon the degree of consideration granted a law by the legislature "se-
riously infringes on the legislature's autonomy.... Nothing in the constitu-
tion directly or indirectly empowers this court to measure the legislative
consideration of a bill for adequacy or intelligence." 98 Justice Abrahamson
emphasized the need for the simplest possible test to determine whether a
bill is private or local.99
Justice Abrahamson rejected the other dissenters' suggestion that no
presumption of constitutionality should apply to legislation challenged as
violative of a procedural constitutional provision when she questioned the
practical significance of a presumption of constitutionality."° Justice Abra-
hamson echoed Chief Justice Heffernan's suggestion that a law challenged
under article IV, section 18 be accorded a "presumption of regularity."' °
Justice Bablitch's dissent focused first upon the paucity of consideration
given the MPCP by the legislature, citing the Wisconsin Assembly and Sen-
ate Bulletin to show that the Senate never "intelligently participate[d] in
95. Id. at 554, 480 N.W.2d at 480 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting); see also Davis v. Grover, 159
Wis. 2d, 150, 165, 464 N.W.2d, 220, 226 (Ct. App. 1990).
96. Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 563, 480 N.W.2d 460, 484 (Abrahamson, J., dissent-
ing). "Chief Justice Heffernan's and Justice Bablitch's dissents add the possibility of the court's
not accepting the legislature's classification, recharacterizing the legislation, and testing the court-
imposed classification for constitutionality." Id.
97. Id. at 562, 480 N.W.2d at 484 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) "EQUALITY; INHERENT
RIGHTS. SECTION 1. All people are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, govern-
ments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." WIS. CONST.
art. 1, § 1 (bold in original).
98. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 563-64, 480 N.W.2d at 484 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 564-65, 480 N.W.2d at 485 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 564 & n.13, 480 N.W.2d at 484-85 & n.13 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 564, 480 N.W.2d at 484-85 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
1992]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
considering" it, contrary to the majority's assertion. 2 The justice would
not afford a presumption of constitutionality to legislation challenged as
procedurally unconstitutional because, as a facially private or local law in a
multi-subject bill, it was violative of article IV, section 18 of the Wisconsin
Constitution. 103 However, rather than presuming unconstitutionality, Jus-
tice Bablitch attached no presumption, carefully scrutinizing such legisla-
tion instead. 1 4
Justice Bablitch suggested that the classification analyzed by the other
justices, that of "school children residing in cities of the first class and at-
tending school districts within cities of the first class," 05 is not the only one
adopted by the MPCP. 106 The MPCP also adopted the classification of pri-
vate schools in first class cities. 07 The justice reasoned that this classifica-
tion failed the first prong of the classification tests because private schools in
first class cities are not substantially distinct from all other private schools
in Wisconsin.108 Justice Bablitch did not deem this classification to be ger-
mane to the "avowed purpose of educational experimentation."109
D. Analysis
The Davis majority held that the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
was not a private or local law. Therefore, its enactment was not unconstitu-
tional under article IV, section 18's prohibition of the passage of such legis-
lation as part of a multi-subject bill. However, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's divided decision failed to clarify this area of the law.
Should a reviewing court presume constitutionality when the procedure
under which a statute was enacted is challenged as unconstitutional? When
a court reviews a statute challenged as violating a substantive constitutional
provision, it presumes the statute is constitutional. This deference, based
upon the separation of powers doctrine, presumes that the legislature,
which is accountable to the electorate, "has already examined the questions
of fact and value choice embodied in the statute." 10 The majority searched
the case record in an attempt to discover whether the legislature gave the
102. Id. at 566, 480 N.W.2d at 485 (Bablitch, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying
note 61.
103. Id. at 573-74, 480 N.W.2d at 488-89 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 574, 480 N.W.2d at 489 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 568, 480 N.W.2d at 486 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 569, 480 N.W.2d at 486-87 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
109. Id., 480 N.W.2d at 487 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
110. JAMES W. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 88-89 (1982).
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MPCP sufficient consideration to satisfy the underlying purposes of article
IV, section 18: ensuring the public accountability of the legislature, guard-
ing "against the danger of legislation, affecting private or local interests,
being smuggled through the legislature," 111 and avoiding internal logrolling
by the legislature.112 The majority found that the legislature gave the
MPCP sufficient consideration to presume these concerns had been met.
However, as Chief Justice Heffernan emphasized, such a post hoc at-
tempt to discern how thoroughly the legislature considered a bill is an in-
fringement upon the legislature's role by the judicial branch.113 Moreover,
it is nearly impossible to make such an investigation based upon whatever
scant records may be available of the state legislative process. Thus, Justice
Bablitch's attempt to prove a lack of legislative consideration was also
futile.' 14
The Brookfield court's departure from the traditional presumption of
constitutionality in article IV, section 18 cases was premised upon the con-
cept that procedural requirements are intended to ensure that the legisla-
ture deliberates upon and is accountable for the legislation it passes, thus
making it deserving of a presumption of constitutionality. If the legislature
did not follow the procedural requirements, the challenged statute should
not be presumed constitutional. However, an article IV, section 18 analysis
determines whether or not the challenged law is local or private and thus
whether it was enacted in compliance with the procedural requirements of
the constitution. It is pointless to make any presumption as to the law's
constitutionality before actually determining whether the procedural re-
quirements upon which this presumption is based were followed. Thus, the
best approach is that suggested by Chief Justice Heffernan' 15 and Justice
Abrahamson:1 16 In article IV, section 18 challenges, a reviewing court
should begin with a presumption of regularity that the legislature did not
violate its duty.
Was the Davis majority correct in holding that the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program was not private or local legislation under article IV, sec-
tion 18 of Wisconsin's Constitution? The court applied the test set forth in
Ill. Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 23, 85 N.W. 131, 136 (1901).
112. City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 144 Wis. 2d 896, 912-13 n.5,
426 N.W.2d 591, 599 n.5 (1988).
113. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 550, 480 N.W.2d at 478-79 (1992) (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 566, 480 N.W.2d at 485-86 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
115. d at 550, 480 N.W.2d at 479 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Integration of Bar
Case, 244 Wis. 8, 28, 11 N.W.2d 604, 614 (1943)).
116. 166 Wis. 2d at 564, 480 N.W.2d at 485 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). See also id. at 574,
480 N.W.2d at 489 (Bablitch, J., dissenting) (a court should not begin its review with a presump-
tion of unconstitutionality).
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Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, 117 because it cor-
rectly characterized section 119.23 as classification legislation. The MPCP
is part of Wisconsin Statutes chapter 119, which applies to a First Class
City School System. The majority's application by analogy of the rule that
the title of a statute is not part of the statute to the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program bill was a useful expansion of this canon of
construction. 118
The court of appeals suggested a modified version of the Brewers test for
entity-specific legislation to determine whether a piece of "experimental"
legislation is private or local. The supreme court wisely rejected this sug-
gestion, recognizing that it would "unnecessarily further complicate this
area of law."' 19
Whether the majority correctly applied the Brookfield test to determine
that the MPCP was not private or local legislation turns upon the question
of whether the test can be applied only to the general characteristics of the
classification (e.g., a population over 150,000 and a mayoral proclamation
of first class city status) or to the de facto characteristics of a city within a
class of cities. The law on this issue is uncertain.
The Brookfield court seemed to apply the test only to the general char-
acteristics of a first class city sewerage district. 120 In its narrow search for
justification in the section 18 context, the Brookfield court stated that it
should avoid seeking post hoc justification for legislation because it was "ill
suited" to decide "economic and political" issues. 2 '
The Davis majority's reliance upon a line of cases indicating that the
specific characteristics of Wisconsin's first class city can be considered' 22
may appeal more to common sense than does the formal approach of con-
sidering only the facial characteristics of the class. However, it does not
serve the goal of determining whether classification legislation is local or
private. This goal is essentially to decide whether a piece of classification
legislation is general enough to demonstrate that the legislature is not trying
to smuggle a bill that affects only narrow interests into a multi-subject bill.
Courts analyzing bills involving first class cities under article IV, section
18 may be confused because Milwaukee is Wisconsin's only first class city.
If there were other first class cities in Wisconsin, it might be obvious that
117. City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 144 Wis. 2d 896, 907-08, 426
N.W.2d 591, 597 (1988).
118. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
119. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 527 n.11, 480 N.W.2d at 469 n.1l (1992).
120. Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 916-17, 426 N.W.2d at 600-01.
121. Id. at 918 n.6, 426 N.W.2d at 601 n.6.
122. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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courts determining whether a classification is private or local should con-
sider only the general characteristics of first class cities, because not all such
cities will share the same specific characteristics.
Applying the elements of the Brookfield test to the general characteris-
tics of first class city school districts would be illustrative. First, Milwau-
kee's population of over 150,000 and declaration of being a first class city
does not make it "'substantially distinct' from other cities such that 'it is
necessary for them, as opposed to all other' cities, to have the choice pro-
gram.2 123 The second element, that the classification must be germane to
the law's purpose, might not be satisfied. Applying the Parental Choice
Program to all cities with over 150,000 residents might not "be closely akin
to, or have a close relationship with, the purpose[s]" 124 of testing whether
public funding of private education can help solve Wisconsin's educational
problems, because not all cities that large may have the same educational
problems.
The Davis court's analysis of whether the MPCP was appropriate for
the specific characteristics of Wisconsin's current first class city seems rea-
sonable and is based on precedent. However, not all cities that might join
the first class may share those characteristics. Thus, a court reviewing a
piece of legislation (within a multi-subject bill and not separately titled) ad-
dressing a statutory classification should look at the general characteristics
of the class to determine whether the statute is appropriate for the entire
class or whether it affects only local or private interests, which is forbidden
by article IV, section 18.
IV. DOES THE MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM VIOLATE
THE UNIFORMITY CLAUSE?
A. Background of Article X, Section 3 Law
The first substantive issue on which the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program was challenged was article X, section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion, which states in relevant part: "The legislature shall provide by law for
the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as
practicable; and such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to
all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years."1 25 This issue turns upon
the definitions of "district schools" and of the uniformity required of them.
123. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 552, 480 N.W.2d at 479 (Bablitch, J., dissenting) (citing Brook-
field, 144 Wis. 2d at 916, 426 N.W.2d at 600).
124. Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 917, 426 N.W.2d at 601.
125. WIs. CONST. art. X, see. 3.
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These definitions are intertwined with the history of public education in
Wisconsin.
Territorial Wisconsin had several types of schools. Local schools,
which were interchangeably called "district," "common," or "primary,"
were organized on a district level and were financed by district property
taxes, charges made by the district to each student, and tuition charged by
the teacher. 12 6 There were two types of private schools financed by tuition
charges: "normal schools" that taught teachers and college preparatory
"academies." 127
The 1845 creation of the first free public school in what is now Kenosha
was a catalyst at the constitutional convention of 1846128 for the proposal of
a statewide system of free public schools. The rejected Wisconsin Constitu-
tion of 1846 included a provision similar to article X, section 3V29 What
eventually became article X, section 3 was not controversial at either of
Wisconsin's constitutional conventions.130 The education committee of the
1847-1848 convention proposed that the constitution's education article re-
quire state funding of a comprehensive educational system, including dis-
trict schools, the state university, and private county academies to educate
teachers for the district schools.13I However, the version of article X passed
by the constitutional convention required state funding of only district
schools and the state university. 132
The Wisconsin Constitution does not specifically define "district
schools." Schools in Wisconsin have been organized on a district basis
since 1841. I 33 When the framers of the Wisconsin Constitution provided
for state funding of "district schools" in article X, section 3, they must have
126. 64 Op. Att'y Gen. 24, 37 (1975).
127. Id.
128. CONRAD E. PATZER, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN WISCONSIN, 11-15, 18 (1924).
129. The rejected Constitution read as follows: "The legislature shall provide for a system of
common schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as may be throughout the state, and the com-
mon schools shall be equally free to all children, and no sectarian instruction be used or permitted
in any common school in this state." WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (1846), reprinted in TENNEY &
ATWOOD, supra note 36, at 317.
130. Erik LeRoy, Comment, The Egalitarian Roots of the Education Article of the Wisconsin
Constitution: Old History, New Interpretation, Buse v. Smith Criticized, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 1325,
1350.
131. Ray A. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution, 1952 WIs. L. REv. 23, 54-55.
132. Id. The framers of the state constitution were overly optimistic in their belief that there
would be a surplus of school funds from the sale of federal lands. Id. at 55-56. Article X, § 2
provides that if any surplus school funds remain after supporting the common schools, they
should "be appropriated to the support and maintenance of academies and normal schools." Id
at 55-56; see also Wis. CONST. art. X, § 2(2).
133. PATZER, supra note 128, at 9.
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been referring to publicly funded "schools maintained in districts after they
are created." '134 Defining their terminology was not the framers' primary
concern:
An examination of the debates in the conventions that framed our
present constitution and the constitution of 1846 (which contained a
similar provision) discloses that the members of those conventions,
when they were framing the article relating to schools, were con-
cerned, not with the method of forming school districts, but with the
character of instruction that should be given in those schools after
the districts were formed, -with the training that these schools
should give to the future citizens of Wisconsin.
Viewing the terms of this constitutional provision in the light of
its express terms as well as of the purpose which actuated those who
drafted it, we conclude that the requirement as to uniformity applies
to the districts after they are formed, -to the character of the instruc-
tion given, -rather than to the means by which they are established
and their boundaries fixed. 131
Recently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court defined the character of in-
struction, which is required by article X, section 3 to be uniform in district
schools, as being "legislatively regulated by sec. 121.02, Stats., regarding,
for example, minimum standards for teacher certification, minimal number
of school days, and standard school curriculum.' '1
36
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Callow began by summarizing the argument of the opponents of
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program: although the schools participat-
ing in the MPCP were "district schools" under article X, section 3, they
failed to provide a uniform "character of instruction" because they were not
subject to section 121.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes.137
The majority held that the MPCP schools were not "district schools"
subject to article X, section 3, for several reasons. The MPCP "unambigu-
ously refers to nonsectarian private schools," and private schools are de-
fined under three sections of the Wisconsin Statutes. 138 Moreover, the
majority rejected the suggestion that because "[p]ublic schools are the ele-
134. State ex rel Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 289, 221 N.W. 860, 862 (1928).
135. Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 486, 436 N.W.2d 568, 575 (1989) (emphasis added)
(quoting Zilisch, 197 Wis. at 289-90, 221 N.W. at 862 (1928)).
136. d at 492-93, 436 N.W.2d at 577-78 (footnote omitted).
137. Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 537, 480 N.W.2d 460, 473 (1992).
138. Id. at 538, 480 N.W.2d at 473. "Private school" means an institution with a private
educational program that meets all of the criteria under § 118.165(1) or is determined to be a
private school by the state superintendent under § 118.167. Wis. STAT. § 115.001(3r) (1989-90).
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mentary and high schools supported by public taxation,"' 3 9 the MPCP
schools' receipt of tax money makes them "district schools."'' "In no case
have we held that the mere appropriation of public monies to a private
school transforms that school into a public school. We decline the opportu-
nity to adopt such a conclusion here." 14'
The majority was satisfied that the existence of private schools receiving
public money, in addition to public schools, did not violate the uniformity
clause. "[W]hen the legislature has provided for each such child the privi-
leges of a district school, which he or she may freely enjoy, the constitu-
tional requirement in that behalf is complied with."' 42 The majority held
that article X, section 3 requires the legislature to provide the opportunity
for all Wisconsin children to receive a free and uniform basic education,
rather than requiring the legislature to ensure that all children take advan-
tage of this opportunity. 4 3 The Davis majority upheld the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's conclusion in Kukor v. Grover 1' that the uniform "char-
acter of instruction" imposed on district schools is legislatively regulated by
section 121.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes. 45
C. The Abrahamson Dissent
Justice Abrahamson wrote the only dissenting opinion that discussed
the Uniformity Clause. 146 After concluding that the majority's characteri-
zation of the MPCP as an experiment left the program subject to a success-
ful constitutional challenge if its coverage or duration were to expand
beyond an extent necessary for experimentation, the justice addressed arti-
cle X, section 3.
First, Justice Abrahamson concluded that the "Parental Choice Pro-
gram violates the mandate of article X that the legislature provide a system
of free public education for children of a certain age."' 47 Noting that the
139. Wis. STAT. § 115.01 (1989-90).
140. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 539, 480 N.W.2d at 474.
141. Id. at 540, 480 N.W.2d at 474.
142. Id. at 538, 480 N.W.2d at 473 (quoting State ex rel. Comstock v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1,
65 Wis. 631, 636-37, 27 N.W. 829, 831 (1886)).
143. See id. at 538-39, 480 N.W.2d at 474.
144. 148 Wis. 2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989).
145. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 537, 480 N.W.2d at 473. Section 121.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes
lists the standards required of district schools regarding such issues as teacher qualifications,
hours of instruction, and curriculum. Wis. STAT. § 121.02 (1989-90).
146. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 555, 480 N.W.2d at 481 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). Chief Jus-
tice Heffernan expressed his accordance with this dissent. Id. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 556, 480 N.W.2d at 481 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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legislature already has the authority to create district schools,14 8 the justice
cited cases holding that article X compels the legislature to use this author-
ity to establish district schools with statewide uniformity and free tuition
for children of certain ages.149 Justice Abrahamson stated:
The legislature could not disband the public school system and pay
every student in the state or every private school a sum for educa-
tion. The state constitution through article X, unlike the federal
Constitution, makes an equal opportunity for government-supported
education a fundamental right of the student and a fundamental re-
sponsibility of state and local government. 150
The justice referred to the rejection of the "patchwork system of diverse
schools with mixed public and private funding that existed during the terri-
torial period" during the debate at Wisconsin's constitutional conven-
tion.151 Justice Abrahamson concluded that the Wisconsin Constitution
prohibits, and case law does not allow, the diversion of "state support for
the district schools to a duplicate, competitive private system of schools."' 52
Justice Abrahamson's second reason for finding the MPCP in violation
of article X, section 3 was that the "[p]rogram does not ensure that the
students who receive basic education through public funding in participat-
ing private schools receive an education as nearly uniform as practicable to
that received by other students who receive basic education through public
funds."15 3 The justice admitted the difficulty of interpreting the Uniformity
Clause of article X, section 3 because of its ambiguity and the fact that the
constitutional framers did not discuss it."54 Justice Abrahamson noted that
case law has established that article X, section 3 "applies to the districts
after they are formed-to the character of the instruction given-rather
than to the means by which they are established and their boundaries
fixed."" 5 The justice used this principle, which was developed in cases in-
volving the boundaries of public school districts, to state that the framers of
148. Id. at 556 & n.2, 480 N.W.2d at 481-82 & n.2, (Abrahamson, J. dissenting) (citing
Outagamie County v. Zuehlke, 165 Wis. 32, 35, 161 N.W. 6, 7 (1917)).
149. Id. at 556-57, 480 N.W.2d at 481 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (citing Manitowoc v.
Manitowoc Rapids, 231 Wis. 94, 98, 285 N.W. 403, 404-05 (1939) and Zweifel v. Joint Dist. No.
1, 76 Wis. 2d 648, 657, 251 N.W.2d 822, 826 (1977)).
150. Id. at 557, 480 N.W.2d at 481 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (citing Kukor v. Grover, 148
Wis. 2d 469, 488, 436 N.W.2d 568, 576 (1989) and Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 569, 247
N.W.2d 141, 150 (1976)).
151. Id., 480 N.W.2d at 482 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. Id at 559, 480 N.W.2d at 482 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 560, 480 N.W.2d at 483 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
155. Id (quoting Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 486, 436 N.W.2d 568, 575 (quoting
State ex reL Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 290, 221 N.W. 860, 862 (1928))).
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article X, section 3 were not concerned with the structure of the school
system that was eventually established. 15 6 "The majority opinion, however,
focuses on the organization of the schools providing the education and not
on the character of the education provided in interpreting the term 'district
schools.' "157
Another basis on which to interpret article X, section 3 is the principle
that the framers of Wisconsin's 1848 Constitution intended uniform public
education to promote participation in the democratic political process and
the assimilation of Wisconsin's diverse immigrant population.1 5 8 Justice
Abrahamson saw the majority opinion as subversive of these goals of public
education, because it permitted public aid to private education absent the
same controls that are imposed on public schools. "Article X, sec. 3 re-
quires the legislature to ensure that all Wisconsin children who receive ba-
sic education through public funding receive a uniform education reflecting
the shared values of our state."' 59
D. Analysis
In considering article X, section 3, the majority and the dissent used
different analytic approaches to justify their decisions. The majority's in-
strumentalist analysis considered some of the practical realities of the Mil-
waukee Parental Choice Program (and ignored others) to uphold what it
seemed to believe is worthwhile social legislation." The dissent's formalist
approach emphasized an adherence to the principles of the framers of Wis-
consin's Constitution over the practical realities of the MPCP to find it in
violation of article X, section 3.161
The majority recognized that although the schools remain private, their
receipt of public funds subjects them to controls necessary to fulfill the
required public purpose.1 62 This common sense characterization of the
MPCP schools as a hybrid of a private entity receiving public money under
public control seems the most reasonable. The sufficiency of these controls
is considered in the next section.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 561, 480 N.W.2d at 483 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, LeRoy,
supra note 130, at 1325-26, 1345-46).
159. Id. at 562, 480 N.W.2d at 483-84 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
160. Linda Sharp Paine, Instrumentalism v. Formalism: Dissolving the Dichotomy, 1978 WIs.
L. Rrv. 997, 1000.
161. Id.
162. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 539-40, 480 N.W.2d at 474.
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The majority recognized that article X, section 3 commands the legisla-
ture to provide Wisconsin's children the opportunity to receive a "free uni-
form basic education." 163 It also recognized that article X, section 3 does
not require the legislature to force children to receive such an education. 1"
In any event, the right to attend a private school has been guaranteed since
1925.116 The majority failed to address, however, whether article X, section
3 compels the legislature to provide a free uniform basic education only
within the district, i.e., public schools.
The majority's article X, section 3 analysis did not consider whether the
funding for the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program through diversion of
state aid from the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) to pay private school
tuition for MPCP students affects the uniformity of the MPS. The majority
stated that "[s]imilar to [legislation distributing state funds to school dis-
tricts equally on a per pupil basis], the MPCP in no way deprives any stu-
dent the opportunity to attend a public school with a uniform character of
education." '166 In its discussion of the public purpose doctrine, the majority
noted that the $2,500 of state aid diverted from the public schools for each
MPCP pupil is less than forty percent of the full cost of educating an MPS
student. 167 Because article X, section 3 involves the allocation of only state
money, the majority did not note that for each student who leaves the MPS
for a private MPCP school, the MPS will save almost $4,000 in local funds.
Because Davis was only a facial constitutional challenge, it would not have
been appropriate for the court to consider whether the uniformity of the
MPS was actually affected.
Because the majority did not find the MPCP schools subject to the uni-
form "character of instruction" under article X, section 3, it did not address
the meaning of a uniform "character of instruction." It merely affirmed the
Kukor v. Grover 168 holding that the "character of instruction" referring to
"district schools" "is legislatively regulated by sec. 121.02, Stats. ' 169 The
court's acceptance of a constitutional standard set by legislation is troubling
because it can be changed at the legislature's whim.
Justice Abrahamson's scholarly dissent used the analytic approach pre-
scribed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court for interpreting provisions of the
Wisconsin Constitution. This analysis contemplates the words of the provi-
163. Id at 539, 480 N.W.2d at 474.
164. Id. at 538-39, 480 N.W.2d at 474.
165. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
166. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 538, 480 N.W.2d at 474.
167. Id. at 545, 480 N.W.2d at 477.
168. 148 Wis. 2d 469, 492, 436 N.W.2d 568, 577 (1989).
169. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 537, 480 N.W.2d at 473.
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sion, the constitutional debates and relevant historical circumstances in
existence in 1848, its earliest legislative interpretations, and, as a last resort,
the framers' objectives.1 7' This principled method of analysis legitimizes a
modem court's interpretation of a nineteenth-century constitution. It
seems to make constitutional adjudication the unbiased logical application
of timeless principles.17 ' However, such a formalist method can be used to
protect the economic and social status quo from progressive legislation.
1 72
As Justice Abrahamson admitted, "[i]nterpretation of the uniformity
provision is difficult because the language is ambiguous and the framers of
the constitution did not discuss this particular clause." 1 73 However, the
justice found the most convincing argument that the framers intended only
the public district schools to be publicly funded in an 1869 Wisconsin
Supreme Court case. Citing to that case, which held a law that allowed a
town to tax its inhabitants to build a private school unconstitutional under
the public purpose doctrine, the concurring justice wrote:
"Our constitution provides for a general system of public free
schools .... And from the general and extensive character of the
provisions upon this subject, I think there is some implication that
this system was designed to be exclusive, and to furnish the only
public instruction which was to be supported by taxation."1 74
Justice Abrahamson, unlike the majority, found the fact that the MPCP
is funded by state money diverted from the Milwaukee Public Schools sup-
plants rather than augments the public education mandated by article X,
section 3175
Justice Abrahamson criticized the majority for focusing "on the organi-
zation of the schools providing the education and not on the character of
the education provided in interpreting the term 'district schools.' "176
There are two problems with this argument. First, the justice cited cases
involving school district boundaries 177 for the proposition that the framers
of article X, section 3 were not concerned with the "structure of the school
170. Id. at 556, 480 N.W.2d at 481 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Beno, 116
Wis. 2d 122, 136-38, 341 N.W.2d 668, 675-76 (1984)).
171. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERI-
CAN LIFE 139 (1988).
172. Id. at 115.
173. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 560, 480 N.W.2d at 483 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 558 n.5, 480 N.W.2d at 482 n.5 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (quoting Curtis's
Adm'r v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350, 359-60 (1869) (Paine, J., concurring)).
175. Id. at 559, 480 N.W.2d at 482 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 556, 480 N.W.2d at 483 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 560 n.7, 480 N.W.2d at 483 n.7 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (citing Larson v.
State Appeal Bd., 56 Wis. 2d 823, 827-28, 202 N.W.2d 920, 922 (1973) and Joint Sch. Dist. v.
Sosalla, 3 Wis. 2d 410, 420, 88 N.W.2d 357, 363 (1958)).
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system established." '178 However, Davis v. Grover is not a dispute over the
structure of school district boundaries. Second, the justice misapprehended
the nature of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program and the majority's
discussion of it. As understood by the majority, the MPCP is an experi-
ment in the relationship between school structure (Le., autonomous private
schools subject to less state bureaucracy than public schools) and the char-
acter and results of the education it provides.17 9
Justice Abrahamson is correct that the framers of the education article
of Wisconsin's Constitution saw public education as a democratizing, as-
similating force in their growing state.18 0 The framers' concerns are still
valid.'81 Justice Abrahamson failed to mention that one of the reasons pri-
vate schools were disfavored in early Wisconsin was that they were per-
ceived as elite havens of the wealthy.18 2  In contrast, the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program applies only to low income children 83 and is lo-
cated in Milwaukee, which suffers the greatest educational and other social
consequences of poverty. 184 Some research and commentary on school
178. Id at 560, 480 N.W.2d at 483 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
179. Id at 531-33, 480 N.W.2d at 470-71.
180. See, eg., LeRoy, supra note 130, at 1325-26, 1345-47. The historical debate over how
much the nineteenth-century public school movement was influenced by the desire of America's
dominant Protestant culture to maintain its hegemony in the face of increasing Roman Catholic
immigration is beyond the scope of this Note. See, eg., LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND
THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL 1825-1925, 69-158, 216-17, 220-21(1987); Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
What the Congress Can Do When the Court is Wrong, in PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC
GOOD 79, 79 (Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr. ed. 1981).
181. Also beyond the scope of this Note is the civil libertarian argument that because educa-
tion necessarily involves the indoctrination of values and beliefs, as does religion, there should be a
separation of school and state as there is of church and state. See STEPHEN ARONS, COMPELLING
BELIEF 189-221 (1983).
182. LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE FOUNDING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN WISCONSIN 189-90
(1956).
183. To be eligible for the MPCP, a pupil's family income may not exceed 175% of the
federal poverty level. Wis. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)1 (1989-90).
184. Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 527-29, 480 N.W.2d 460, 469-70 (1992).
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choice has involved poor and minority parents' interest in it185 and its po-
tential benefits for their children. 186
Which opinion is correct? The majority is correct that the Parental
Choice Program schools are private schools rather than public district
schools under article X, section 3. As the majority noted, the framers of
article X, section 3 intended the legislature to provide at least a minimal
opportunity for a free, uniform, basic education. Justice Abrahamson was
also correct that the framers wanted to replace territorial Wisconsin's
patchwork system of public and private schools. However, it is doubtful
that the limited funding (.04% of total public spending on education)187
and limited enrollment (no more than 1% of Milwaukee's school children)
of the MPCP poses a threat to the "uniformity" of publicly funded educa-
tion in Wisconsin, whether by draining money from public schools or by
supporting differently regulated schools.
V. DOES THE PUBLIC FUNDING OF PRIVATE SCHOOL EDUCATION
VIOLATE THE PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE?
A. The Public Purpose Doctrine
The final challenge to the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program was that
it violated Wisconsin's implicit constitutional public purpose doctrine. This
judicial doctrine constitutionalizes the political ethic that "governmental
power should be used for the benefit of the entire community." '8 That is,
public money must be spent for public purposes. Its first appearance in
Wisconsin case law was in Soens v. Racine.189
The Wisconsin Supreme Court outlined the modern public purpose doc-
trine in State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter.19 0 "[Wjhat constitutes a public pur-
pose is in the first instance a question for the legislature to determine and its
185. Priscilla Ahlgren, Why Poor Parents Like the Program's Options, MILWAUKEE J., Nov.
21, 1991, at Al; see also KIRKPATRICK, supra note 1, at 144, 151 (citing two Gallup polls (1983 &
1986) showing minority support for tuition voucher plans); Schneider, Schooling for Poor and
Minority Children, in PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC POLICY 73, 84 (Boyd & Cibulka ed. 1989)
(The reasons poor and minority parents have chosen private schools include: greater emphasis on
reading, writing, and math; positive social development; higher expectations of the students; the
opportunity to communicate with more accessible private school teachers; the opportunity for
parental involvement; and the educational philosophy of private schools).
186. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 1, at 89, 111 (citing economists Thomas Sowell and Milton
Friedman, who support public voucher aid for private school tuition); see also Rotunda, supra
note 7, at 930 n.77 (discussing successful private schools serving African-American pupils).
187. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 546, 480 N.W.2d at 477.
188. Lewis R. Mills, The Public Purpose Doctrine in Wisconsin, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 40, 40.
189. 10 Wis. 271 (1860).
190. 44 Wis. 2d 201, 170 N.W.2d 790 (1969).
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opinion should be given great weight."' 91 The legitimate purposes for
which public money may be spent change over time as societal expectations
of government change.19
2
A private entity may be used to accomplish a public purpose as long as
it is "under reasonable regulations for control and accountability to secure
public interests."' 193 The reasonableness of a regulation is a matter "of de-
gree and depends upon the purposes, the agency and the surrounding cir-
cumstances. Only such control and accountability as is reasonably
necessary under the circumstances to attain the public purpose is required.
Budgeting and auditing are, of course, basic and necessary controls; addi-
tional types of control vary .... 19" For example, the court noted that an
1867 appropriation of public money to build a private school building was
found unconstitutional in Curtis's Administrator v. Whipple 195 partly be-
cause the taxpayers lacked control or supervision through audits or partici-
pation in management.' 96
B. The Majority Opinion
After summarizing the public purpose doctrine, the majority noted:
"No party disputes that education constitutes a valid public purpose, nor
that private schools may be employed to ftuther that purpose."' 197 The
court then addressed whether the private MPCP schools were under
"proper government control and supervision."' 198 The majority compared
the present situation to that in Reuter.199 First, the state appropriation to
the Marquette School of Medicine was earmarked for "medical education,
teaching and research," while section 119.23 does not have express require-
ments for the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program private schools."c°
However, the majority found that these schools are required to provide edu-
cation complying with the statutory requirements for private schools.20'
191. Id. at 212, 170 N.W.2d at 794.
192. Id. at 213, 170 N.W.2d at 795.
193. Id. at 216, 170 N.W.2d at 796 (quoting Wisconsin Indus. Sch. v. Clark County, 103 Wis.
651, 667, 79 N.W. 422, 427 (1899)).
194. Id
195. 24 Wis. 350 (1869).
196. Id (citing Curtis's Adm'r v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350 (1869)).
197. Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 541, 480 N.W.2d 460, 475 (1992).
198. Id (citing Wisconsin Indus. School v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 667, 79 N.W. 422,
427 (1899)); see also State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d 201, 215, 170 N.W.2d 790, 796
(1969).
199. State ex rel Warren v. Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d 201, 170 N.W.2d 790 (1969).
200. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 542, 480 N.W.2d at 475.
201. Id at 542-43, 480 N.W. 2d at 475.
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Similarly, the use of only some state aid to public schools is statutorily
limited.2 "2
Second, the court addressed the challenge that while the medical school
was "accredited by an independent national organization as well as federal
and state agencies,120 3 the MPCP private schools are not required to prove
the quality of the education they provide.2" Section 119.23(2)(a) applies
the MPCP to "nonsectarian private schools." The court listed the statutory
requirements for private schools:
Under sec. 118.165, Stats., a private school must:
(1) be organized to primarily provide private or religious-based
education;
(2) be privately controlled;
(3) provide at least 875 hours of instruction each school year;
(4) provide a sequentially progressive curriculum of fundamental in-
structions in reading, language arts, mathematics, social studies,
science, and health;
(5) not be operated or instituted for the purpose of avoiding or cir-
cumventing compulsory school attendance; and
(6) have pupils return home not less than two months of each year
unless the institution is also licensed as a child welfare agency.205
The majority listed some of the controls on the MPCP: the State Super-
intendent of Public Instruction must annually report to the legislature com-
paring MPCP and MPS students regarding academic achievement, daily
attendance, and percentages of pupils dropping out, suspended, or ex-
pelled;216 and the Superintendent "may" and the Legislative Audit Bureau
"shall" conduct financial and performance audits of the MPCP. 2° 7 The ma-
jority also found that because the MPCP gave eligible parents the opportu-
nity to move their children to the participating school which they felt met
their needs, "parental choice preserves accountability for the best interests
of the children. ' 208 Thus, the majority found the private MPCP Schools
were under the control of both state statute and parental choice.
The majority cited dicta in Wisconsin v. Yoder 219 in which the United
States Supreme Court "declared that purely secular considerations 'may not
202. Id. at 542, 480 N.W. 2d at 475.
203. Id. (citing State ex rel Warren v. Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d, 201, 217, 170 N.W.2d, 790, 797
(1969)).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 543, 480 N.W.2d at 475.
206. Id. at 543, 480 N.W.2d at 476; see Wis. STAT. § 119.23(5)(d) (1989-90).
207. Id. at 544, 480 N.W.2d at 476; see Wis. STAT. § 119.23(9)(a) & (b) (1989-90).
208. Id.
209. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education.' "210
The majority was satisfied that because the premise of the MPCP is that
"less bureaucracy coupled with parental choice improves educational qual-
ity,"211 the MPCP's reporting and private school requirements for partici-
pating private schools (which are more liberal than the statutory
requirements for public schools) "provide sufficient and reasonable state
control under the circumstances. 21
2
Finally, the majority noted that the controls on the MPCP were suffi-
cient and reasonable because the amount of money allocated to the MPCP
depends on tax funding of public education213 and is relatively inconsequen-
tial. The $2,500 of state aid to educate each MPCP student is less than
forty percent of the $6,451 average cost of educating a Milwaukee Public
School pupil. 214 At most, $2.5 million of tax money (approximately .04%
of the over $6.4 billion annually spent on public education in Wisconsin)
will be appropriated to the MPCP. 2
15
C. Analysis
A consideration of whether the Davis court adequately applied the pub-
lic purpose doctrine turns upon two questions: Is the private education of
low income children a proper purpose for the expenditure of public money,
and does the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program contain sufficient con-
trols and supervision to ensure that the public purpose is met?
The majority did not mention the concurrence in Whipple which sug-
gested that the Wisconsin Constitution's general and extensive provisions
regarding public education indicate that a privately established and con-
trolled school is a private object that cannot be supported by tax money.216
However, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated, "what could not be
deemed a public use a century ago, may, because of changed economic and
industrial conditions, be such today ... "217
210. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 545, 480 N.W.2d at 476 (emphasis added) (citing Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215).
211. Id. at 543, 480 N.W.2d at 476.
212. Id. at 545, 480 N.W.2d at 476.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 545-46, 480 N.W.2d at 476-77.
215. Id.
216. Curtis's Adm'r v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350, 360 (1869); see also Lewis R. Mills, The Public
Purpose Doctrine in Wisconsin Part 1L" The Application of the Doctrine By The Wisconsin Supreme
Court, 1957 WXis. L. REv. 282, 291.
217. State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d 201, 213, 170 N.W.2d 790, 795 (1969) (quot-
ing State ex rel. Wisconsin Dev. Auth. v. Dammann, 228 Wis. 147, 182, 280 N.W. 698, 709
(1938)).
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The Davis majority did not address all of the statutory controls imposed
by the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program on participating private
schools. Section 119.23(7)(a) provides that each school shall meet at least
one of four criteria:
1. At least 70% of the pupils in the program advance one grade
level each year.
2. The private school's average attendance rate for the pupils in the
program is at least 90%.
3. At least 80% of the pupils in the program demonstrate signifi-
cant academic progress.
4. At least 70% of the families of pupils in the program meet par-
ent involvement criteria established by the private school.218
However, except for the attendance rate, each school can subjectively de-
cide whether it has satisfied a criterion. Perhaps that is why the court did
not address these criteria as "controls." MPCP schools may not discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, color, or national origin.2 1 9
The majority compared the MPCP to the state aid given to the Mar-
quette School of Medicine, which was upheld in Reuter,220 but did not note
the differences. Reuter did not involve the basic education of pupils be-
tween the ages of four and twenty. Moreover, not only was the Marquette
School of Medicine's budget audited (as are the budgets of the MPCP
schools), but also the state had a one-third representation on the medical
school's board of directors.221 The majority stated the "underlying thesis"
of the MPCP to be "that less bureaucracy coupled with parental choice
improves educational quality. ' 222 Section 119.23 states neither this premise
nor any other public purpose. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that
a legislative declaration of a statute's public purpose is not determinative
but can be helpful if supported by the facts.223
Parental choice proponents argue that autonomy from bureaucratic
control is the most important factor in a school's educational effective-
ness.224 Choice schools would be held accountable for the quality of their
education "from below, by parents and students who directly experience
218. Wis. STAT. § 119.23(7)(a) (1989-90).
219. Section 119.23(2)(a)4 of the Wisconsin Statutes applies 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to the MPCP.
WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)4 (1989-90). Private schools must meet "all health and safety laws or
codes that apply to public schools." Wis. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)5 (1989-90).
220. Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 541-42, 480 N.W.2d 460, 475 (1992).
221. State ex rel Warren v. Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d at 217, 170 N.W.2d at 796 (1969).
222. Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 543, 480 N.W.2d at 476.
223. Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d at 212, 170 N.W.2d at 794.
224. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
183 (1990).
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their services and are free to choose., 2 2 5 The existence of alternative
schools providing publicly-funded education would force public schools to
improve to compete for students.226
Regardless of whether the proponents or the opponents of parental
choice are ultimately correct, Davis v. Grover 227 is not the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's first recognition that parents are "the persons under natu-
ral conditions having the most effective motives and inclinations and being
in the best position and under the strongest obligation to give to such chil-
dren proper nurture, education and training. '228
Was the majority correct in finding sufficient control and supervision
over the private schools paid to educate the children participating in the
MPCP? The Reuter court set a liberal standard:
A private agency cannot and should not be controlled as two-fistedly
as a governmental agency. If such need for control is present, it
might be better to use a governmental agency. A private agency is
selected to aid the government because it can perform the service as
well or better than the government. We should not bog down pri-
vate agencies with unnecessary governmental control.229
Finally, it is interesting to compare the relative degree of control and
supervision of the MPCP schools and the public schools. Failure to meet at
least one of the four performance criteria imposed on the MPCP schools
will make them ineligible to participate in the program the following
year.230 The weaknesses of these criteria were discussed above. Public
schools are subject to statutory and regulatory standards in order to receive
state aid.23' However, they are not required to prove compliance.232 The
State Superintendent of Public Instruction has sole discretion to withhold
state aid in order to enforce the requirements.2 3 The superintendent is not
225. Id. at 225.
226. Newman, supra note 1, at 179. Supporters of school choice also argue that it would
promote pluralism in education, because more students could afford to attend private schools
beyond their public school district boundaries that segregate by socio-economic status and race.
Debate Transcript, The Merits or Demerits of the Public Funding of Private Education, 1 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 453, 458-59 (1985) (Lawrence Uzzell, President of LEARN,
Inc., of Washington, D.C.). However, Wisconsin limits the Parental Choice Program to students
and schools within the same first class city. WIs. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a) (1989-90).
227. 166 Wis. 2d 501, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992).
228. Wisconsin Indus. Sch. v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 668-69, 79 N.W. 422, 428 (1899).
229. State ex rel Warren v. Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d 201, 217, 170 N.W.2d 790, 797 (1969).
230. Wis. STAT. § 119.23(7)(b) (1989-90).
231. Mark Hazelbaker & David C. Hertel, Privatization and the "Primarily Related" Test: A
Case for Clarification, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 451, 453 (1991).
232. Id.
233. Id.
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required to withhold state aid if a public school does not meet state stan-
dards, and in fact has never done So.234
VI. CONCLUSION
The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program2 35 is America's first experi-
ment with using public funds to educate low income children in nonsec-
tarian private schools chosen by their parents. It will not be the last. Its
affirmation will encourage similar programs elsewhere. President Bush ad-
vocated parental choice as part of his "America 2000" school reform
plan.2 36 "The Parental Choice in Education Initiative, which would expand
choice in the public schools and provide vouchers starting at about $2,500
per student for children who attend private schools" has been proposed in
California.237
Wisconsin's experience with this controversial policy foreshadows what
will happen wherever it is proposed. The litigants will be similar. The pro-
ponents will be parents seeking public aid to subsidize the exercise of their
constitutional right to educate their children in private schools 238 instead ofin public schools that they already fund with their taxes. Parental choice
has long been opposed by powerful teacher unions,239 such as the National
Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers, who fear
any threat to the near monopoly that public schools have on American ele-
mentary and secondary education.24  The battle over parental choice is es-
sentially an example of the classic economic problem of organized
234. Id. at 453-54 & n.14.
235. Wis. STAT. § 119.23 (1989-90).
236. Ahlgren, supra note 185, at Al; see Bush Puts Wisconsin Choice Plan in Spotlight, MIL-
WAUKEE J., June 25, 1992, at A3. President Bush has proposed a $500 million federal program
providing tuition vouchers for below median income families to use at public or private (nonsec-
tarian and parochial) schools. Passage of this controversial proposal is unlikely. Bush Puts Wis-
consin Choice Plan in Spotlight, supra at A3.
237. Debra J. Saunders, School Choice Makes Educrat Lobbies Quiver, MILWAUKEE J., Feb.
10, 1992, at A9.
238. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). The United States Supreme
Court has asserted that the lack of public funding for private education does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462
(1973). Likewise it does not update the Due Process Clause. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318
(1979).
239. Stephen D. Sugarman & John E. Coons, How to End the Public School Monopoly, Bus.
& Soc'Y REv. 29, 29 (Fall, 1980); see also, e.g., Hazelbaker & Hertel, supra note 231, at 476 n.75.
The Wisconsin Education Association Council (WEAC), one of the litigants opposing the MPCP,
is a good example. In 1987-88, WEAC's Political Action Committee contributed $640,832.82 to
state candidates. This amount is over three times as much as the second largest amount of contri-
butions and more than all of the other top eight contributors combined.
240. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 1, at 77-87; see also Saunders, supra note 237.
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producers seeking to maintain their control of the market at the expense of
their unorganized consumers.
As in Davis v. Grover,241 this struggle will focus upon the education arti-
cles of state constitutions and will be couched in terms of educational qual-
ity, the democratizing role of public schools, and the proper purpose for the
expenditure of public money. These provisions vary widely, from merely
pronouncing the importance of education to mandating free public school
systems.242 Proponents and opponents of public aid to parents for the pur-
pose of paying private school tuition may wish to amend state constitutions
written in the nineteenth century to explicitly address this contemporary
issue.
The challenge of a program of state funding of private school tuition
was a case of first impression in Wisconsin, as it will be elsewhere. The
Davis majority found that despite their receipt of public funds, the schools
in the MPCP remain private. Therefore, they are subject to neither article
X, section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution that requires the legislature to
establish free, uniform, district schools for elementary and secondary age
students nor to the statutory requirements placed on public schools. The
dissent drew upon limited precedent to argue that the framers of Wiscon-
sin's Constitution intended the public schools to be the only ones financed
by taxation. The majority accepted the premise that parental choice can
serve the public purpose of providing quality education.
The theory of parental choice is that funding education is a public re-
sponsibility, but that it can be provided most effectively in schools autono-
mous from bureaucratic control. The schools in a parental choice program
are accountable to parents who can purchase educational services elsewhere
in the marketplace. Market-driven competition is presumed to spur im-
provement in educational quality by all schools. The question of whether
public aid giving low income parents the choice to educate their children in
private schools improves education in America or affects the democratizing
role of public education will be answered in part by the results of the Mil-
waukee Parental Choice Program.
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